

United States to Iraq, 26-08-1992

United States, France, Great Britain and Russia to Iraq, 06-01-1993

United States, France, Great Britain and Russia to Iraq, 14-01-1993

Towards the end of February 1991, US president Bush unilaterally declared a cease fire marking the end of the 1900/1991 Gulf War. In early March the Iraqi government accepted the terms of the cease fire when it signed the Safwan Accords.¹ The terms of the Safwan Accords were taken up in multiple UNSC Resolutions, most importantly UNSCR 686, 687 and 688. In addition to spelling out in greater detail the terms of the cease fire agreement, these resolutions included the establishment of a weapon inspection regime under the auspices of the UN and the establishment of no fly-zones for fixed wing aircraft for the Iraqi government.² Despite the fact that the Iraqi government had signed the Safwan Accords, it did not fully accept the terms of the UNSC resolutions. At multiple occasions it barred weapons inspectors from carrying out their work. It also violated the no fly-zone in Northern Iraq.³ The Iraqi government, dominated by Sunnis, was carrying out military actions against Shi-ite groups in southern Iraq. Over the spring and the summer of 1992, pressure mounted on US president Bush to support and protect the Kurds in the North and the Shi-ites in the South. Bush was running for re-election against Clinton who accused Bush of shirking his responsibilities to protect these minorities. In late August 1992, US National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, announced the intention of the US government to create another no fly-zone in the south below the 32nd parallel 'to protect minority groups...not to cause or encourage the split-up of Iraq.'⁴ While Kuwait and Russia welcomed the decision, and France and Great Britain rallied behind the US, Syria and Egypt condemned the plan, and Saudi Arabia silently acceded.⁵ Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein accused the US of trying to 'partition the region to seize control over its oil wealth.'⁶ At a press conference held on 26 August the US President announced publicly the implementation of a new no fly-zone which would start operating twenty-four hours later. Iraq would have to stop operating its aircraft in that zone or face military punishment. The terms of the ultimatum were also delivered to the Iraq Ambassador to the United Nations Abdul Amir Anbari. US Lt. Gen. Martin Brandtner declared that 'no Iraqi aircraft, either fixed-wing or rotary wing, military or civilian, will be allowed to fly south of the 32nd Parallel' ...and that the US 'will respond appropriately and decisively to any Iraqi failure to comply with this requirement or any other interference with our air operations.'⁷ He also added that it was 'a no-fly zone, not a security zone' indicating that the US did not intend to initiate action against the estimated 60,000 Iraqi armed forces on the ground.⁸ One Iraqi representative asserted that the US and its allies Great Britain and France were set at involving the entire region 'into the

¹ Freedman and Karsh, *The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991*, 407.

² Freedman and Karsh, 416–18.

³ Prados, 'Iraq', 1–4.

⁴ John Davis, *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War: From Forty One to Forty Three* (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006), 210.

⁵ Davis, 211. 'Bush Announces Ultimatum', *Ellensburg Daily Record - Google News Archive Search*, 26 August 1992.

⁶ Davis, *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War*, 212.

⁷ Douglas Jehl and John M. Broder, "'No-Fly' Zone in Iraq Starts Today, Bush Says: Persian Gulf: Allied Patrols Are Designed to Shield the Shiites and to Encourage Dissidents against Hussein.", *Los Angeles Times*, 27 August 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-08-27/news/mn-6881_1_persian-gulf.

⁸ Jehl and Broder; Davis, *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War*, 211.

fire of racial and sectarian conflicts.⁹ Al Thawra, the outlet of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party, responded that the 'great people [of Iraq] are on a state of alert, unified and angry along with their leadership and armed forces and are ready to fight the enemies and to foil their Zionist-imperialist schemes.'¹⁰ But the following day, before the expiration of the deadline, the Revolutionary Command Council under the leadership of President Saddam Hussein's indicated that it would not continue the 20-30 daily flights it operated in the area.¹¹ It issued a statement which read:

We shall choose the proper way and the proper time to confront this outrageous aggression ...reserv[ing] the right to choose the way of action toward this aggressive resolution and the methods of rejecting it... due time.¹²

The US fighter jets that started patrolling the area immediately after the expiration of the deadline did not encounter any resistance.¹³ Tensions continued to linger, however, on the ground, while the UNSC continued to find fault with Iraq for not living up to the terms of the UNSC Resolutions.¹⁴ When US President Bush lost his bid for re-election, Saddam Hussein started testing the waters oncemore. In December 1992, Iraqi fighter jets repeatedly entered the no fly-zones in the North and the South. On 27 December 1992, two US fighter jets engaged Iraqi fighter jets that had violated the zone. One Iraqi jet was downed. At the same time reports surfaced that the Iraqi government had been installing anti-aircraft systems on the ground which would endanger the safety of the pilots enforcing the no fly-zone.¹⁵ The US government – still under the leadership of President Bush – responded robustly. It enlisted the support of Great Britain, France and Russia and presented a joint ultimatum on 6 January.¹⁶ This time the expiration limit was 48 hours. The ultimatum was not officially made public but its contents were leaked to the press. The ultimatum demanded that:

All SAM systems which have been moved into new positions south of the 32d parallel should be returned to their original sites or configurations within 48 hours of the delivery of the demarche.¹⁷

Diplomats involved in the talk further asserted that the ultimatum explicitly emphasised that it was a final warning and that the United States and its allies will react 'appropriately and decisively' in

⁹ Jehl and Broder, "'No-Fly' Zone in Iraq Starts Today, Bush Says'.

¹⁰ 'Baghdad Denounces Action by U.S., Allies', *Ellensburg Daily Record - Google News Archive Search*, 26 August 1992.

¹¹ Davis, *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War*, 211. 'Allies Set to Deliver Ultimatum to Iraq', *Times Daily - Google News Archive Search*, 26 August 1992, 08-26-1992 edition, <https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1842&dat=19920826&id=3UoeAAAAIBAJ&sjid=GccEAAAAIBAJ&pg=1242,3744825&hl=en>.

¹² John M. Broder and Mark Fineman, 'U.S. Warplanes Patrol Iraqi Zone, Meet No Resistance : Persian Gulf: Baghdad Vows to Challenge "no-Fly" Move, but Retaliation May Be Political, Not Military.', *Los Angeles Times*, 28 August 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-08-28/news/mn-6042_1_persian-gulf.

¹³ Broder and Fineman.

¹⁴ Prados, 'Iraq', 5.

¹⁵ Prados, 6.; Lawrence Freedman, *A Choice Of Enemies: America Confronts The Middle East* (London: Hachette UK, 2010), 287; Davis, *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War*, 213.

¹⁶ Marc Weller, *Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law* (Oxford University Press, 2010), 75–78.

¹⁷ Michael R. Gordon, 'Iraq Given Friday Deadline on Missiles', *The New York Times*, 7 January 1993, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/07/world/iraq-given-friday-deadline-on-missiles.html>.

case of Iraq's failure to comply.¹⁸ The French UN ambassador stated that 'the language was the language of an ultimatum' which contained a 'certain delay' and constituted 'the final warning to the Iraqi authorities to the effect that we have to see the (missile batteries as) hostile acts and they have to remove their missile batteries.'¹⁹ Twenty-four hours later, the government of Iraq asserted its prerogative to deploy air defense assets anywhere it wanted (accusing the powers of imposing their will outside of the UN),²⁰ in a four-page memorandum in response to the ultimatum to the ambassadors of the four countries.²¹ In the next twenty-four hours, it seemed to be redeploying these assets further north prior to the expiration of the deadline. Even though cloudy weather prevented the US from fully verifying Iraq's compliance, for the moment the US decided to refrain from punitive action, officially declaring that 'all available evidence indicates that Iraq is acceding to the requirements of the coalition's [January] 6 demarche.'²² It emphasised that the 'coalition's January 6 demarche remains in effect' and that no further warnings would be issued should Iraq defect again.²³ At the same time the Iraqi government declared its intent to prohibit UN weapon inspectors from carrying out their work, which elicited another UNSC condemnation warning Iraq of 'serious consequences that will flow from such continued defiance'.²⁴ On 10 and 11 January, Iraqi forces entered Kuwaiti territory to recover military equipment which they had left behind after their withdrawal. Iraqi anti-aircraft systems were then once again moved to below the 32nd parallel. US president Bush, a few days before leaving office, then decided to go ahead without offering another warning, with one presidential aide telling journalists 'it's just a matter of when to pull the trigger' and strike at Iraqi targets in order to punish Saddam for behavior it dubbed 'cheat and retreat'.²⁵

On 13 January, eight Iraqi air defense targets were bombed by 110 fighter jets from coalition forces – including those of France, Great Britain and the United States.²⁶ According to the Iraqi government, 19 Iraqi civilians were killed.²⁷ UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali stated on January 14, 1993, that

¹⁸ Gordon.; see also James Ross McKay, 'The Coalition and the Coercion of Iraq, 1991-1999 - PhD Dissertation, King's College, London' (2003), 226, [https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-coalition-and-the-coercion-of-iraq-19911999\(86f74408-8ae6-49b9-b3a6-f5729d60d4a6\).html](https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-coalition-and-the-coercion-of-iraq-19911999(86f74408-8ae6-49b9-b3a6-f5729d60d4a6).html).

¹⁹ Marc Weller, 'US Press Release: Iraq Warned Move Missiles--Keep Out of No-Fly Zone, 7 January 1993', in *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath* (Grotius Publications, 1993), 734.

²⁰ 'Iraq Asserts Right to Put Missiles in No Fly Zone', *The Milwaukee Sentinel - Google News Archive Search*, 1 August 1993.

²¹ Marc Weller, 'US Press Release: Iraq Ignores Allied Warning, 7 January 1999', in *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath* (Grotius Publications, 1993), 735.

²² Reuben E. Brigety, *Ethics, Technology and the American Way of War: Cruise Missiles and US Security Policy* (Routledge, 2007), 77.

²³ Marc Weller, 'White House Statement on Iraq, 9 January 1993', in *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath* (Grotius Publications, 1993).

²⁴ Brigety, *Ethics, Technology and the American Way of War*, 77. Davis, *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War*, 213. 'Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Middle East, 23. Items Relating to the Situation between Iraq and Kuwait' (United Nations), 962, accessed 18 May 2015, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/>. Marc Weller, 'UN Press Release: Security Council Demands That Iraq Not Interfere With UN Flights Transporting Personnel Into Iraqi Territory, 8 January 1993', in *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath* (Grotius Publications, 1993), 736.

²⁵ Michael R. Gordon, 'Bush Said to Plan Air Strike on Iraq Over Its Defiance', *The New York Times*, 13 January 1993, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/13/world/bush-said-to-plan-air-strike-on-iraq-over-its-defiance.html>.; 'Bush Bolsters Troops to Halt Iraqi Incursions', *The Milwaukee Sentinel - Google News Archive Search*, 14 January 1993.

²⁶ Weller, *Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law*, 75–78. Prados, 'Iraq', 7, fn. 5. R. W. Jr. Apple, 'Raid on Iraq: US and Allied Planes Hit Iraq Bombing Missile Sites in South in Reply to Hussein's Defiance', *The New York Times*, 14 January 1993, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/14/world/raid-iraq-us-allied-planes-hit-iraq-bombing-missile-sites-south-reply-hussein-s.html>. Freedman, *A Choice Of Enemies*, 287. Davis, *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War*, 213–14.

²⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman, 'The Iraq Crisis: A Chronology of the "War of Sanctions"' (12 February 1998), 10, http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/981202_iraqahcchron.pdf.

the raid and the forces that carried out the raid, have received a mandate from the Security Council, according to Resolution 687 [...] [and] this action was taken and conforms to the resolutions of the Security Council and conformed to the Charter of the United Nations.²⁸ The US also lifted another 1,000 forces into Kuwait and deployed four naval vessels to the area.²⁹ Iraqi president Saddam Hussein called for another 'battle of jihad'.³⁰ The Iraqi UN ambassador finally let it be known that Iraq would no longer intrude on the Kuwaiti border and would allow UN inspectors to use their own aircraft, even if it still rejected the no-fly zones.³¹

On 14 January, US alongside with Great Britain, France and Russia, issued another ultimatum demanding that Iraq allow UN weapon inspectors to carry out inspection flights and land on Iraqi territory before 4.00 p.m. EST on 15 January.³² Prior to the expiration of the deadline, the Iraqi government seemed to indicate a willingness to comply. It suggested several alternative flight routes for the UN weapon inspectors which came attached with various conditions. These were rejected and the bombing continued on 17 and 18 January, once again targeting air defence systems as well as what was claimed to be a 'nuclear fabricating plant'.³³ On 19 January the Iraqi government proposed a 'cease-fire... to enable the new Administration to study the no-fly zones.'³⁴ The international coalition assembled behind the US government meanwhile was fragmenting. Key members, including Russia and Turkey, and to a lesser degree France and Great Britain, worried that the bombings were not covered by the UN mandate.³⁵ They pushed for moderation.³⁶ Stephanopolous, communications director of the incoming president Clinton, let it be known that 'we need full compliance with the UN resolutions. Until we see that, we shouldn't see a change in policy.'³⁷ The next few days saw again a handful of aerial attacks.³⁸ These subsequently petered out over the next few months, but hostilities would flare up on multiple occasions in the years after. According to the government of Iraq, at least 40 Iraqis were killed in January.³⁹ The government of Iraq largely accepted the no fly-zones and for the time being allowed UN weapons inspectors to do their work, even if it would return to actively spurn what it considered illegal external interference in the future.⁴⁰

²⁸ David Malone, *The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 142.

²⁹ Prados, 'Iraq', 8–9.

³⁰ Youssef M. Ibrahim, 'RAID ON IRAQ; Iraqi Leader Voices Defiance, Vowing to Repel Allied Raids', *The New York Times*, 14 January 1993, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/14/world/raid-on-iraq-iraqi-leader-voices-defiance-vowing-to-repel-allied-raids.html>.

³¹ 'Chronology October 16, 1992-January 15, 1993', *Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2 (1 April 1993): 325–26.

³² Reports of this ultimatum were only found in the secondary literature. See Cordesman, 'The Iraq Crisis: A Chronology of the "War of Sanctions"', 10. Prados, 'Iraq', 8. Marc Weller, 'Press Statement Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, 14 January 1993', in *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath* (Grotius Publications, 1993), 744. Marc Weller, 'Statement in the House of Commons by the UK Secretary of State for Defence, 18 January 1993', in *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath* (Grotius Publications, 1993), 748–49.

³³ Prados, 'Iraq', 8. Cordesman, 'The Iraq Crisis: A Chronology of the "War of Sanctions"', 9–11. 'Chronology October 16, 1992-January 15, 1993', 326. Weller, *Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law*, 118.

³⁴ Prados, 'Iraq', 8.

³⁵ Marc Weller, *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and Their Aftermath* (Grotius Publications, 1993), 749–52.

³⁶ Weller, *Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law*, 76–80. Prados, 'Iraq', 20. 'Allies Growing Tense As U.S. Strikes Iraq Again', *tribunedigital-chicagotribune*, 20 January 1993, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1993-01-20/news/9303170345_1_iraqi-flights-kurds-in-northern-iraq-radar-site. for an overview of various declarations see position, see

³⁷ 'Allies Growing Tense As U.S. Strikes Iraq Again'.

³⁸ 'Iraq Denies Firing', *The New York Times*, 25 January 1993, sec. World, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/25/world/iraq-denies-firing.html>.

³⁹ Prados, 'Iraq', 7, 9.

⁴⁰ Davis, *Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War*, 217. See also Frank P. Harvey and Patrick James, 'Deterrence and Compellence in Iraq, 1991-2003: Lessons for a Complex Paradigm' (15 December 1998), 12–13,

